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Abstract:       
 
In a period where decentralisation seemed to be the prominent trend, Norway in 2002 chose to 
re-centralise the hospital sector. The reform had three main aims; cost control, efficiency and 
reduced waiting times. This study investigates whether the hospital reform has improved 
hospital productivity using the other four major Nordic countries as controls. Hospital 
productivity measures are obtained using data envelopment analysis (DEA) on a comparable 
dataset of 728 Nordic hospitals in the period 1999 to 2004. First a common reference frontier 
is established for the four countries, enveloping the technologies of each of the countries and 
years. Bootstrapping techniques are applied to the obtained productivity estimates to assess 
uncertainty and correct for bias. Second, these are regressed on a set of explanatory variables 
in order to separate the effect of the hospital reform from the effects of other structural, 
financial and organizational variables. A fixed hospital effect model is used, as random effects 
and OLS specifications are rejected. Robustness is examined through alternate model 
specifications, including stochastic frontier analysis (SFA). The SFA approach in performed 
using the Battese & Coelli (1995) one stage procedure where the inefficiency term is 
estimated as a function of the set of explanatory variables used in the second stage in the DEA 
approach. Results indicate that the hospital reform in Norway seems to have improved the 
level of productivity in the magnitude of approximately 4 % or more. While there are small or 
contradictory estimates of the effects of case mix and activity based financing, the length of 
stay is clearly negatively associated with estimated productivity. Results are robust to choice 
of efficiency estimation technique and various definition of when the reform effect takes 
place. 
   
Keywords: Efficiency, productivity, DEA, SFA, hospitals    




Efficient use of resources is a common health policy goal across virtually all health care 
systems. To obtain this goal a mix of policy initiatives aimed at purchaser and providers are 
used. In broad terms the health care systems in Europe can be characterised as either 
insurance based or tax based. Policy initiatives in social insurance based systems have 
primarily been directed towards increased competition between insurers (Saltman et al., 
2005), while health care policy in tax based systems to a larger extent have focused on the 
relationship between purchasers and providers. Lately, however, we have seen several 
reforms whose aim has been the organization of the purchaser level (Saltman et al., 2007). 
Notable examples are the introduction of primary care trusts in the UK, and the 
recentralization of the Norwegian and Danish systems. Parallel to this the use of activity 
based financing, usually via patient classification systems such as the diagnosis related groups 




The multitude of models used to organize the purchaser level and to pay providers can be 
explained both by historical, cultural and political factors. It is nevertheless interesting to 
observe such a variety of solutions in the organization of a sector where the overall goals 
(productivity, quality, access and cost containment) hardly differ between countries. This 
variety is the background for this paper. Our focus is on the centralization of hospital 
ownership following the Norwegian hospital reform in 2002, and its subsequent effect on one 
of the health policy goals; efficiency in the utilization of resources. Thus our basic intention is 
                                                 
1 The share of activity based financing in Norway increased from an initial level of 30 % in 1997 to 60 % in 2003. It has since 
been reduced to 40 %, the main argument being fear of cream-skimming.   4
by the way of a cross-national comparative study to provide answers to the question; does 
centralization of the purchaser and provider role provide effects in terms of increased levels 
of productivity? Analyses of health care reforms are often difficult because of the problems 
related to separating the effects of the reform from other possible explanations, such as 
developments in medical technology, public expectations and policy changes. Thus the setting 
of this project is the hospital care systems of Norway, Sweden, Finland and Denmark. While 
similar, there are still substantial differences with regards to the financing of hospital services, 
the degree of (de)centralization, management structures and the degree of political 
involvement (Linna et al., 2008). While the focus is on Norway, we however use Finland, 
Sweden and (to some degree) Denmark as a control group. In order to analyse the 
productivity effects of the Norwegian reform, it is not necessary to use output prices, nor is it 
necessary to make any assumptions on the technological possibility sets of different countries 
and years, but only to establish a common reference set for measuring productivity and use 
the relative rates of transformation along the frontier of the reference set as weights instead of 
prices. In order to isolate the reform effect from the effect of other changes that may influence 
the productivity development of Norwegian hospitals, it is however necessary to control for 
variables that change over time for individual hospitals. 
 
There are a relatively large number of analyses of hospital efficiency and productivity, but 
only a few are based on cross-national data sets (Mobley & Magnussen, 1998; Dervaux et al., 
2004, Steinmann et al. 2004, Linna et al., 2006, Kittelsen et al., 2007). Such analyses often 
find quite substantial differences in performance between countries. Such differences may be 
due to the dissimilar hospital structures and financing schemes discussed above, but may also 
result from methodological problems. Cross-national analyses are often based on data sets that 
only to a limited extent are comparable – in the sense that inputs and outputs are defined and   5
measured differently across countries. It is, however, well known that the way we measure 
hospital performance may influence the empirical efficiency measures (Magnussen, 1996).  
We therefore provide robustness tests and alternate specifications of the reform effect on 
productivity. 
 
2. The Norwegian Hospital reform 
 
In a period where decentralisation seemed to be the prominent trend, Norway in 2002 chose to 
re-centralise the hospital sector. There were four main elements in this reform. Firstly, the 
central governments took over responsibility for all somatic and psychiatric hospitals and 
other parts of specialist care from the 19 counties. As a result approximately 100 000 
employees or 60 000 man-years and almost 60 % of county councils budget were transferred 
from the counties to the state. Second, the Minister of Health Affairs, as the general assembly 
for the regional health enterprises, became responsible for overall general management of 
specialist care. Third, the central government kept the five health regions that were 
established in 1974 as the organizational unit for coordination and steering. This implied that 
the new organization could start out with up-to-date descriptions of supply side and demand 
side factors, and with already prepared plans for restructuring.  
 
While these three elements of the hospital reform imply a centralization of the hospital sector; 
the fourth element of the reform represents a decentralization: Both the health regions and the 
hospitals were organized as health enterprises, which are separate legal entities to a large 
extent modelled on commercial companies. Five regional health enterprises were established 
covering each of the five health regions. A board elected by the Ministry of Health is the body 
that is formally responsible to the ministry. The regional health enterprises have the statutory   6
responsibility for ensuring the provision of health services to inhabitants in their geographical 
area, and each regional health enterprise is the owner of most health care providers in its 
region. The argument for choosing enterprises and not the directorate model is related to the 
aim of having politicians on arm length distance. The hospitals and clinics were merged into 
42 (local) enterprises. This number was later (2003) reduced to 32. Both the numbers of 
regional and local enterprises have been under consideration after reform. In 2007 the number 
of regional health enterprises was reduced to 4, and the number of local health enterprises is 
presently 28. Representatives from the regional enterprises are often leaders of the boards that 
govern the local enterprises. The system can be characterized as highly integrated. 
 
The reform had three main aims; cost control, efficiency and reduced waiting lists. In an early 
discussion of reform effects Magnussen et al. (2007) concludes that cost control has not 
improved but that waiting lists are down and that efficiency seemingly did increase. Their 
conclusion was however not based on a rigorous analysis. Thus the aim of this paper is to add 
to our knowledge of the effects of the reform by providing a better analysis of the effects of 




Meaningful cross national analyses must be based on comparable data. Measures of hospital 
efficiency and productivity require accurate measures of inputs and outputs. It is well known 
that efficiency measures are sensitive to operationalisation of hospital output (Magnussen, 
1996). In a cross national analysis where we also utilise panel data there are several 
challenges both related to defining inputs and outputs similarly, and related to how one should 
adjust for wage/price differences. We have chosen the following approach:   7
 
Table 1: Relative input price indices for physician and nurses wage costs (including social 
security and pension payments) and overall hospital input costs. 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Physicians wage cost index 
Denmark  - 0.889 0.933 0.975 1.009 1.041 
Sweden  0.855 0.898 0.945 1.006 1.054 1.076 
Finland  0.770 0.767 0.795 0.860 0.939 1.000 
Norway  0.892 0.907 0.943 0.981 1.131 1.159 
Nurses wage cost index 
Denmark  - 1.223 1.270 1.317 1.360 1.412 
Sweden  1.119 1.177 1.239 1.266 1.323 1.361 
Finland  0.850 0.868 0.897 0.927 0.965 1.000 
Norway  1.173 1.267 1.250 1.368 1.413 1.464 
Overall hospital input price index 
Denmark  - 1.124 1.158 1.199 1.230 1.267 
Sweden  1.030 1.066 1.115 1.147 1.184 1.210 
Finland  0.867 0.878 0.900 0.931 0.968 1.000 
Norway  1.087 1.134 1.140 1.214 1.272 1.306 
No information available for Denmark in 1999. 
 
Inputs are measured as operating costs, which for reasons of data availability are exclusive of 
capital costs and costs associated with teaching and research. Costs are initially measured in 
nominal prices in each country’s national currency. To harmonize costs between the four 
countries over time we have constructed three separate price indices; one for physicians, one 
for nurses and one for “other resources”. The wage indices are based on official wage date 
and include all personnel costs, i.e. pension costs and indirect labour taxes. The index for 
“other resources” is based on the harmonized CPI from Eurostat, and is converted to EURO 
using a purchaser parity corrected price index from OECD. We assume that costs are 
distributed between the three inputs with 20 % on physicians, 50 % on nurses and 30 % on 
other resources. Finally we construct a Paasche-index using Finland in 2004 as reference 
point. Note that this represents an approximation, the index will only hold exactly in the case 
of the relative use of inputs is constant over time. Table 1 shows relative wages for physicians   8
and nurses and the overall deflator used in the analysis, where in each case is relative to the 
level for Finland in 2004
2.  
 
Table 2: Hospital observations by country and year. 
  1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 Total 
Denmark       54    54 
Sweden      39 49 49 51 188 
Finland  37 39 39 38 39 38 230 
Norway  42 42 43 43 43 43 256 
Total  79  81  121 184 131 132 728 
 
 
Outputs are measured by using the Nordic version of the Diagnosis related groups (DRGs). 
We define six broad output categories; inpatient medical care, day medical care, inpatient 
surgical care, day surgical care, other patient care and outpatient visits. Within each category 
patients are weighted with a common Nordic cost weight calculated as the weighted average 
of the national cost weights. Outpatient visits were not weighted. While national weights may 
change from year to year, we have chosen to use the weights calculated for the year 2002 on 
the whole data set. Hence we expect to reduce problems associated with changes in coding 
practice. Table 2 shows the distribution of hospitals between countries and years, while table 
3 shows summary statistics. 
 
We note that Swedish hospitals are larger than the hospitals in the other countries. In some 
cases this is due to data limitations
3. Also note that Swedish hospitals have a lower level of 
                                                 
2 Even after harmonizing the input price levels there might be differences in the accounting systems that might 
cause some uncertainty and impact the comparability of the data. To the extent that these differences are 
country-specific they may influence estimated productivity levels, but not the estimates of the effect of the 
Norwegian reform. 
3 Some of the Swedish and a few of the Norwegian units for analysis are administrative aggregates rather than 
hospitals. The variance around the mean will be less due to this.   9




Table 3: Average values for real costs (input) and service production (outputs) per hospital by 
country, and outputs per unit of real costs. 
 
 Denmark Sweden Finland Norway  All 
Input:    
 Costs in MEUR          71.35       134.30         69.28         70.95          86.81 
Outputs:    
 Surgical inpatients DRGs   6795 10675 8204 6926 8288 
 Medical inpatients DRGs   9074 13470 9113 8825 10134 
 Surgical daypatients DRGs   0 881 1298 1474 1156 
 Medical daypatients DRGs   0 373 104 203 200 
 Other DRGs   1370 994 646 816 849 
 Outpatients   123611 141382 120308 63290 103368 
Outputs per MEUR:    
 Surgical inpatients DRGs   5.0 10.7 12.7 8.5 9.8 
 Medical inpatients DRGs   6.6 13.6 14.1 10.8 11.9 
 Surgical daypatients DRGs   0.0 0.9 2.0 1.8 1.4 
 Medical daypatients DRGs   0.0 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.2 
 Other DRGs   1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
 Outpatients   90.2 142.3 186.2 77.5 121.7 
Observations  54 188 230 256 728 




Technical productivity  
Efficiency and productivity are often used interchangeably. Strictly speaking productivity 
denotes the ratio of inputs and outputs, while efficiency is a relative measure comparing 
actual to optimal productivity. Most productivity indexes rely on prices to weigh several 
inputs and/or outputs, but building on Malmquist (1953), Caves et al. (1982) recognised that 
one can instead use properties of the production function, i.e. rates of transformation and 
                                                 
4 The reporting of day-care and outpatient visits from the Swedish hospitals present local variations and has large 
scarcities. As for 2004, 23 percent of the data was missing. As for 2001- 2003 the share of missing data was even 
larger.   10
substitution along the frontier of the production possibility set, for an implicit weighting of 
inputs and outputs. 
 
This analysis departs from Farrell (1957) who defined technical efficiency as: 
  { } TE Min ( , ) ii i T θθ =∈ xy  (1) 
Where ( , ) ii x y  is the input/output vector for an observation i, and T is the technology or 
production possibility set. For an input/output-vector (,) x y  to be part of the production 
possibility set, we need to be able to produce y using x.   
 
If there are variable returns to scale, Farrell’s measure of technical efficiency depends on the 
size of the observation, so that we can account for (dis)economies of scale. Even if we were 
interested in technical efficiency, our data does not allow us to estimate the scale properties 
since there are some instances in Sweden and Norway where we do not have each hospital as 
an observational unit, only administrative aggregates of hospitals.  Our approach here is 
instead to use a measure of technical productivity by rescaling inputs and outputs
5: 
  { } , TP Min ( , ) , ii i T θλ θθ λ =∈ xy  (2) 
where the homogenous envelopment of the technology  T λ  contains all input-output 
combinations that are a proportionate rescaling of a feasible point in the technology setT . 
 
Furthermore, it is not necessary to assume that the technologies of different countries and time 
periods are identical in order to compare productivity, as long as one has a common reference 
set. While it is normal to use a specific time period as a reference (as in Berg et al., 1992), or 
                                                 
5 While this is formally identical to a ”CRS technical efficiency” measure, our interpretation here is instead that 
the reference surface is a homogenous envelopment of the underlying technology. This is the same assumption 
normally used in Malmquist indices of productivity change (see e.g. Grifell-Tatjé and Lovell, 1995), but we 
prefer here to analyse the effect of the reform on productivity levels rather than indices.   11
to construct geometric averages of indices based on consecutive time periods (as in Färe et al., 




TT =∪∪  (3) 
where the technology T
tc is for year t and country c. The reference set (3) is not itself a 
technology, only an envelopment of technologies, as is the rescaled set  T λ . The consequence 
of using  T λ  instead of T  is to estimate productivity by weighing inputs and outputs by the 
relative slopes on the frontier that represents homogenous envelopment of all observed 
technologies, rather than estimate technical efficiency by weighing inputs and outputs by the 
relative the slopes on the frontier of a specific technology or its estimate. 
 
DEA estimates of technology 
In order obtain empirical measures we utilise the method known as data envelopment analysis 
(DEA), as developed in among others Charnes et al. (1978). DEA is built on three major 
assumptions: 
 
Firstly we assume that the observed combinations of inputs and outputs are possible. A 
sufficient condition for this is that there are no measurement errors. Even though this 
assumption is implausible in its extreme form, measurement errors will be of less importance 
when the goal is to analyze the development of productivity over time. Secondly we assume 
free disposal, i.e. one can always use more of an input without reducing production or 
produce less without increasing the use of inputs. Finally we assume convexity, i.e. linear 
combinations of observations are also possible. When these three are combined an estimate of 
the production possibility set in a country c and year t is given as: 
  () { } ˆ ,, 1 , 0 tc tc tc
tc
jj jj j j jN jN jN T λλ λ λ
∈∈ ∈ =≤ ≥ = > ∑∑ ∑ xy y y, x x  (4)   12
 
The empirical estimate for technical productivity is then given by the insertion of (4) and (3) 
in (2): 
    { } ,,




TT θλ θλ θθ λ θθ λ
⎧ ⎫
=∈ =∈ ⎨ ⎬
⎩⎭
xy xy ∪∪  (5) 
 
Bootstrapping DEA estimates 
To calculate confidence intervals for the DEA estimates of technical productivity we use a 
bootstrapping technique developed by Simar and Wilson (1998). This also provides bias corrected 
estimates. The methods assume that we know the data generating process (DGP) and can replicate this 
in a pseudo world where our original reference set frontier estimate plays the role of the known 
pseudo-frontier.  
 
The empirical distribution of the efficiency scores from the original DEA run is used to estimate a 
smoothed distribution by a kernel density estimate (KDE) using reflection to avoid the accumulation 
of efficiency score values of one (Silverman, 1986). This is necessary in order to have a consistent 
estimator of the efficiency score distribution at the efficient part of the distribution. The pseudo 
observations are then created by projecting all inefficient observations to the DEA frontier and 
drawing randomly an efficiency score for each unit from the KDE distribution. A new DEA frontier is 
then estimated on these pseudo observations, each generated by mimicking the original Data 
Generating Process (DGP), as if the original DEA estimated frontier were the true frontier. The new 
frontier must lie on the inside of the original DEA frontier.  We then know the bias of the estimate in 
our pseudo world, and can use this as an estimate of the bias of our original estimator.  
 
The estimated bias is used to calculate a corrected estimate of the original productivity measure for 
each observation. The replication is done in a large number of iterations (2000), and the resulting 
distribution is assumed to be an estimate of the real sampling distribution, and we are thus able to   13
calculate mean bias-corrected estimates, standard errors of means and confidence intervals for the 
productivity estimates of each observation   
i TP  as well as for groups of observations such as countries 
and time periods. 
 
Second stage regression methods 
To test the statistical association of the productivity estimates with variables that are not 
inputs and outputs, including the Norwegian hospital reform, a second stage regression 
analysis is conducted. The bias-corrected estimates   
itc TP  from the bootstrapped DEA analysis 
is regressed on the explanatory variables: 
   
0 itc r itc j jitc t t i i itc j TP R z T I αα α α α ε =+ + + + + ∑  (6) 
which is the fixed effect (FE) specification with a reform dummy R, a vector of other 
explanatory variables z, annual time dummies T and hospital dummies Ii. This FE model is 
tested against an ordinary least square (OLS) model with an F-test, and against a random 
effects (RE) model with a Hausman test. Both the OLS and the RE models include country 
dummies, but these are superfluous in the FE model. 
 
Note that the distribution of the bias-corrected productivity estimates that result from the 
bootstrap analysis does not have a mass point at 1.0, and these are therefore not censored. The 
TOBIT analysis widely used in the literature for second stage analysis of DEA estimates is 
therefore inappropriate (Simar and Wilson, 2007)
6. 
 
Stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) method 
                                                 
6 Simar and Wilson (2007) further argue that a separability assumption is needed for the two-stage approach to 
be consistent when estimating technical input efficiency, in essence that the influence of the second stage 
variables be on the radial efficiency only and not on the mix of inputs and the level of outputs. Since we are 
concerned with technical productivity rather than efficiency, i.e. with differences in productivity derived from a 
common set of output weights rather than distance behind the frontier of the production possibility set, we do not 
feel it necessary to make such assumptions here.   14
As a robustness analysis, an SFA model is estimated, with assumptions as close as possible as 
those used in the DEA model. When there is only one input, the technology set can be 
expressed by the equivalent input requirement function: 
  { } () M i n (,) x Fx x T =∈ yy  (7) 
which is also equivalent to a cost function when the input price is normalised to 1 as in our 
application. Technical efficiency is here the ratio of necessary to actual inputs 
  {} Min ( , ) Min ( , ) ( )/ ii i x i i i i
ii
xx
T E xT xT F x
xx
θ θθ
⎧⎫ ⎪⎪ =∈ = ∈ = ⎨⎬
⎪⎪ ⎩⎭
yy y  (8) 
which is equivalent to the cost efficiency defined as the ratio of necessary to actual costs. The 
Battese & Coelli (1995) SFA model in its cost function form can be estimated using the 
Frontier 4.1 computer program (Coelli, 1996), with F(y) parameterised as a Cobb-Douglas 





β = ∏ y .  Since there are many zeroes in the DRG data, only two outputs 
can be used, outpatients and DRGs (j=1,2). To interpret the results as productivity measures, 
we need to impose constant returns to scale,  1 j jβ = ∑ , and achieve this by dividing by the 
DRG output
7. The estimated model is then 
 
1













22 (0, ), ( , ) 0 itc V itc itc U VN UN m σσ > ∼∼  (10) 
where the V are normal error terms, but the U are one-sided inefficiency terms truncated at 
zero and with expected value as a function of the explanatory variables of the same form as 
(6), i.e. for the FE case, 
FE:  0 itc r itc j jitc t t i i j mR z T I ββ β β β =+ + + + ∑  (11) 
                                                 
7 To interpret the estimated productivity reference frontier as a consistent envelopment of the production 
possibility frontiers for country- and year-specific technologies, certain regularity conditions might be needed. 
Since we only use SFA as a robustness exercise in this analysis, we do not pursue these conditions further.   15
With constant returns to scale and all countries and time periods in the estimation, 
itc U e
−  will 
have the interpretation of estimated technical productivity rather than technical productivity. 
To compare the SFA results with the second stage DEA results above, we report the estimated 
marginal effect of an explanatory variable zj on productivity at the mean calculated as  
itc U
je β −  rather than the estimated coefficients themselves. 
 
5. Results and discussion 
 
In Kittelsen et al. (2007) the productivity measures for Finland and Denmark are estimated as 
higher than for Norway, and these are again generally higher than the measures from Sweden. 
As they stand, these are pure productivity numbers, and may or may not reflect underlying 
differences in possibilities or country-specific factors that are not accounted for, rather than 
differences in efficiency. We pursue the differences between countries elsewhere (Linna et al., 
2008), as in this paper the focus is on the effects of the Norwegian hospital reform. In this 
context the purpose of including the other three countries is to provide a control group.  
 
Figure 1 shows the mean bias-corrected productivity measures for the three countries that 
have more than one year of observations for the period 1999-2004, normalised to the 2001 
level for each country
8. Also shown are the confidence intervals for these mean estimates for 
each country and year. The estimates are from the DEA bootstrap method, and do not reflect 
the second stage regressions or the parametric SFA estimates. 
 
                                                 
8 2001 is the earliest year with observations for three countries. The Danish observations are only for the year 
2002, and have no influence on the control group productivity development, but are still influencing the 









1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Sweden Finland Norway
 
Figure 1: Average bias-corrected productivity levels and 95% confidence intervals by country 
and year, normalised to 2001 = 100% for each country 
 
The figure clearly shows how the productivity development for the three last years almost 
coincide, and that the Norwegian development was characterised by a slight productivity 
increase from the years before the reform of 2002  to the years after the reform, while Sweden 
and Finland showed a decline over the same periods. The figure points to a specific 
Norwegian productivity development between the periods that could be associated with the 
reform. The underlying numbers shows that both the output of hospital services and of 
hospital costs have increased substantially in Norway over the period, but that former have 
increased somewhat more than the latter. 
 
The purpose of the second stage analysis is to see whether the productivity development of 
the individual hospitals varies sufficiently systematically between countries to be associated 
with the reform, and to separate the effect of the reform from the effect of other factors. Such 
factors will partly be structural changes not related to the reform, changes in treatment   17
practice and treatment technology and changes in incentive structures not related to the 
reform. Thus we focus on: 
-  Changes in payment system, operationalised through the changes and variations in the 
share of activity based financing (ABF). The share of ABF has varied between years 
in Norway, but for the most remained constant in the other countries, although it 
varies between Swedish counties. 
-  Major structural and technological changes, operationalised through annual time 
dummies to capture time-varying effects not captured by other variables. 
-  Hospital specific heterogeneity, through use of hospital fixed effects or random effects 
models. 
 
In addition to this we include variables that may correct potential measurement errors. The 
variables included in the analysis are: 
-  Case-mix index (CMI) is included because we are not fully satisfied that the DRG 
based case mix adjustment full captures the variation in our material. Increased CMI 
implies a more resource demanding case-mix 
-  Length of stay deviation (LOS_D) is calculated as the difference between actual 
length of stay and the length of stay we would have expected had all patients in the 
hospital had average DRG-specific length of stay. This variable will in part correct for 
measurement error in the output variable and in part reflect true changes in 
productivity. 
-  Country dummies to capture country effects that may reflect institutional and 
geographic differences that are not captured by other variables. These dummies will be 
redundant in the hospital fixed effects model as each hospital belongs to the same 
country in all periods.    18
Descriptive statistics are given in table 4. 
 
Table 4: Average values over individual hospitals (standard deviations) of independent 
variables in second stage regression, by year.  
  1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
0.79   0.79   0.83   0.85   0.85   0.82  
 Case-mix index (CMI) 
(0.09) (0.08) (0.09) (0.10) (0.10) (0.09) 
0.93   0.93   0.96   0.98   0.97   0.97   Length of stay deviation 
(LOS-D)  (0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.13) 
0.27   0.26   0.29   0.22   0.33   0.27    Activity based financing 
percentage (ABF)  (0.25) (0.25) (0.27) (0.31) (0.34) (0.30) 
CMI is hospital DRG points per patient relative to total DRG points per patients in sample as a whole. LOS-D is 
DRG-weighted average hospital length of stay in each DRG relative to total length of stay in the DRG for the 
whole sample 
 
In this analysis the effect of the hospital reform will manifest itself as a shift in the 
productivity variable relative to trend. It is therefore of importance how we operationalise the 
reform. Two approaches are chosen. In model A we capture the reform through a dummy 
variable for the Norwegian hospitals for the years 2002, 2003 and 2004, which is the three 
years following the reform. Thus we expect to see a shift in productivity from the first year. In 
model B we capture the reform through dummy variables for the years 2003 and 2004 only. 
This specification has two advantages. First we open up for a reform effect that is not 
necessarily immediate, second we can account for some data inaccuracies related to the 
distribution of costs between 2001 and 2002
9 by including a separate dummy variable for 
these years. 
 
Our data consists of an unbalanced panel for the period 1999 to 2004. The regression results 
are based on the bias corrected productivity measures from the bootstrap analyses. The 
analyses are done using i) no hospital effects (OLS), ii) hospital random-effects (RE) and iii) 
hospital fixed-effects (FE). Fixed effects imply time invariant hospital specific dummies and 
                                                 
9 The transfer of hospitals from counties to state implied a change of accounting system that broadly led to 
measured costs in 2001 being too low and measured costs in 2002 being too high.   19
only utilise within hospital variation over the time period. All the factors assumed to be 
constant over time (i.e. relative differences between countries) will be captured by these 
dummies. The random effects model will utilise between variations as well and therefore 
generally be more efficient. If there are omitted variables that are correlated with the 
explanatory variables, the estimates may, however, be biased. A Hausman test rejects 
random-effect for both models, and an F-test rejects the no-hospital effects in favour of the 
Fixed-effects specification. The results of the second stage FE regression analysis are given in 
table 5, while the OLS and RE models are not included in the table since these specifications 
were rejected. 
 
Table 5: DEA and SFA regression results. Marginal effect on productivity at sample mean 
and t-values..  N=728,  * implies p<0.05, ** p<0.01 
Model DEA.A  DEA.B  SFA.A  SFA.B 
Productivity estimates  Bootstrapped 
DEA 
Bootstrapped 
DEA  SFA SFA 
Reform  dummy  Reform_A Reform_B Reform_A Reform_B 
Hospital effects  Fixed (FE)  Fixed (FE)  Fixed (FE)  Fixed (FE) 
0.049**    0.063**    Reform_A 
(Norway and 2002-2004)  (5.88)  (8.77)   
  0.043**   0.148*  Reform_B 
(Norway and 2003-2004)   (4.05)    (2.01) 
 -0.018   0.067  Norway 2001   (1.57)    (0.88) 
  0.034**   0.178*  Norway 2002   (2.81)    (2.24) 
0.093 0.090  -0.038  -0.334   Case-mix index (CMI)   (1.52) (1.47)  (1.24)  (1.15) 
-0.285** -0.298**  -0.298**  -0.043  Length of stay deviation 
(LOS-D)   (6.37) (6.57)  (13.34)  (0.18) 
-0.0041 0.0053  -0.099**  0.146   Activity based financing 
percentage (ABF)   (0.14) (0.17)  (3.11)  (0.80) 
+ Hospital fixed effects  yes  yes  yes  yes 
+ Annual time dummies  yes  yes  yes  yes 
R
2 0.9056  0.9062     
F-test hospital fixed effect  14.35**  14.37**     
Hausman test random effect  31.47**  29.89**     
Log likelihood      1065.65  753.17 
DEA OLS second stage regression with individual hospital bootstrap bias-corrected productivity estimates as 
dependent variable. SFA regressions with Battese & Coelli (1995) model specification transformed to marginal 
effects as -(regression coefficient)* (mean efficiency). 
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The effect of the hospital reform is positive and in the magnitude of more then 4 percentage 
points. We have performed several sensitivity analyses using alternative output specifications 
and the DEA method, and the results are robust to these changes (Kittelsen et al. 2007). 
Performing the analysis on the Norwegian hospitals only, gives similar results, although the 
reform effect loses its statistical significance, probably due to reduced number of degrees of 
freedom or multicollinearity between the reform dummy and time variables. Our 
interpretation is that the development in productivity in Norway parallels that in the other 
Nordic countries with the notable exception of the shift resulting from the reform. 
 
A change in case-mix index does not have any effect on our estimates of productivity, while 
increased positive deviation from expected LOS is associated with reduced productivity (as 
expected). We also note that we fail to detect any effects of the changes in activity based 
financing in the preferred fixed effect models. The random effect specification associates 
higher productivity from higher ABF, with a 5 per cent confidence level, a result that is more 
in line with earlier studies (e.g. Biørn et al. 2003). This may be due to the fact that the FE 
model eliminates any variation in productivity that is associated with differences in ABF 
between hospitals, including those between Swedish countries, while the RE models includes 
these. 
 
In addition to the second stage regression analysis of the DEA estimated productivity 
measures, we have examined robustness by estimating an SFA model with the same set of 
explanatory variables, including time and hospital fixed effects. The inefficiency term is 
estimated as a function of these explanatory variables, applying the single-stage approach of 
Battese and Coelli (1995).  The marginal effects are shown in the rightmost two columns of 
table 5. For the model A with the reform effect as the years 2002-4 in Norway, the SFA   21
results are very similar, with a highly significant reform effect of 6.3 per cent. While the 
effects of CMI and LOS are similar as well, there is a counter-expected negative productivity 
effect from ABF, which may be due the limited variability of this variable. For model B, the 
reform effect is quite a lot larger, but much less precisely estimated, as are several of the other 
coefficients. For this specification at least, the functional form imposed on the technology by 
SFA may limit the overall goodness of fit of the model. 
 
6. Concluding comments 
Our analysis indicates that the centralization of hospital ownership in the Norwegian 
ownership reform has had a positive effect on the productivity level of hospitals in the order 
of 4 per cent. The analysis does not show which aspects of the reform that have contributed to 
this improvement, but by controlling for some key variables the results indicate that the 
reform effect does not work through changes in case-mix (CMI), length of stay (LOS) or 
changes in activity based financing (ABF). Use of the Nordic countries as a control group has 
been useful by providing enough degrees of freedom to give the results statistical 
significance, and further shows that the reform effect is not due to changes in technology or 
other circumstances that are common to the Nordic countries. The reform effect is also robust 
to various model specifications. 
 
Two themes emerge as areas for future research. First we need to acknowledge that “health 
reform”, even in the form of centralized ownership, is a somewhat fuzzy type of intervention. 
Thus more knowledge is needed before we can say  why a recentralization of ownership 
would lead to higher levels of productivity. Possible explanations are structural changes – e.g. 
that the number of health enterprises has decreased substantially – better management or a 
tighter fiscal control. Previous analysis of the reform (Magnussen et al, 2007) suggests that   22
the latter has not been the case, thus we are left with structural changes and better 
management. Both these factors, however, need closer investigation. Second, the results also 
indicate that there are clear differences in the productivity levels of the Nordic countries, and 
explanations of these differences will be the object of further research.   23
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